NAFTA and the Environment: The “Greening” of Mexico by Organ, Lawrence A. & Williams, John M.
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE "GREENING" OF MEXICO
Lawrence A. Organ and John M. Williams
INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement' (NAFTA) links the
economies of the United States, Mexico, and Canada-countries with drastically
different levels of wealth. To illustrate, in 1988, the per capita income in
Mexico was $4,9962 whereas the per capita incomes of both the United States
and Canada were in excess of $16,000? As a result of their greater wealth,
both Canada and the United States have been able to fund environmental
programs at levels that poorer countries, such as Mexico, cannot match.4
Mexico has instead given priority to economic growth over environmental
protection.
5
NAFTA is expected to create new investment opportunities and to increase
industrial activity in Mexico, making it more prosperous. With increased wealth
comes an increased concern for the environment, but increased industrial
activity generates increased pollution. How NAFTA is implemented will be
critical to determining which trend prevails.
This Note focuses on the potential environmental ramifications of NAFTA
in Mexico and the states along the U.S.-Mexico border (Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, and California). Part I examines the status of the Mexican environ-
ment as well as the statutory and bureaucratic framework designed to protect
the environment. Part II discusses the environmental protections incorporated
into both NAFTA and its side agreement on the environment. Part Ill
evaluates the potential environmental consequences of NAFTA by considering
the effects of free trade on the environment, the institutional mechanisms
incorporated into NAFTA and the side agreement, and the environmental
impacts of prior bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico.
This Note concludes that economic stimulation under NAFTA, coupled with
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. Congress authorized the United State's participation in NAFTA on
December 8, 1993. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter Implementation Act].
2. Robert Summers & Alan Heston, The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of
International Comparisons, 1950-1988, 106 Q. J. ECON. 327, 352 (1991).
3. GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF A NORTH
AMERICAN FREETRADE AGREEMENT 15 n.15 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 3914, 1991). All income figures are in U.S. dollars.
4. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-188, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENT: STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 4 (1992).
5. SUSAN FLETCHER & MARY TIEMANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
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the environmental safeguards in the side agreement, will improve the
environment of Mexico and the border region. The key to success will be in
augmenting the environmental enforcement authority of the institutions charged
with implementing NAFTA.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND THE
MExIcAN ENVIRONMENT
Mexico has been criticized for allocating insufficient resources to
environmental protection.6 As a result, pollutants have degraded Mexico's air
quality and contaminated its surface and groundwaters. Increased economic
activity under NAFTA will likely exacerbate these problems. Predicting the
impact of NAFTA on Mexico requires a basic understanding of the current
structure of Mexico's government and its approach to environmental protection
programs.
A. Government Framework
The Mexican executive branch has significantly more power than its United
States or Canadian counterparts. For example, Mexico's executive branch
initiates legislation, and any subsequent changes by the Mexican Congress
rarely affect the substance of the legislation Furthermore, executive agencies
are given wide latitude in interpreting the law and may issue regulations
without legislative action.' Mexico's president is elected for a six year term of
office and cannot seek a second term. Therefore, every six years there is the
potential for substantial shifts in policy.
The current government of President Salinas de Gortari began such a shift
in 1988 with an ambitious effort to improve Mexico's environmental program.
In January of that year, Mexico passed a comprehensive environmental law, the
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection.9
Pursuant to this legislation, Mexico's Secretaria de Desarrallo Urbano y
Ecologfa (SEDUE) ° issued new regulations concerning air pollution, solid
waste disposal, environmental impact assessment, and automobile emission
6. See, e.g., Justin Ward & Glenn T. Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade Agreement,
ENVIRONMENT, May 1992, at 2, 3.
7. Daniel Basurto-Gonzalez, The Environmental Law of Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION §1.1 (J. Andrew Schlickman et al. eds., 1991).
8. Id.
9. Although this law was actually passed under President Salinas de Gortari's predecessor, it
was drafted by a close Salinas associate and made a part of the Salinas campaign. Stephen P.
Mumme, Cleaning the Air: Environmental Reform in Mexico, ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 1991, at 7, 10.
10. SEDUE, Mexico's federal environmental agency, was roughly equivalent to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. In May 1992, Mexico created a new agency to handle
environmental affairs and social development. This new agency, the Secretariat of Social
Development (SEDESOL), took over SEDUE's environmental programs. Jay L. Camillo, North
American Free Trade and the Environment, Bus. AMERICA, Oct. 18, 1993, at 38-39.
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controls. Officials in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA)
have found the new regulations to be comparable to their United States
counterparts.'2
For Mexico, the major question is whether it will have the financial
resources and the inclination necessary to enforce these new environmental
regulations. To supplement enforcement, President Salinas de Gortari has
increased the budget of SEDUE from roughly $6 million (U.S. dollars) in 1989,
to $36 million in 1991,"3 and to $77 million in 1993.14 In comparison, the U.S.
EPA has a total annual budget of approximately $5 billion, and Texas spends
$100 million on sewer projects alone. 5 Thus, while SEDUE's budget has
increased dramatically, it still is relatively limited. Total public expenditures on
environmental programs in 1993 amounted to $2.5 billion or about one percent
of Mexico's gross national product. 6 Although this budget comparison makes
Mexico's expenditures seem small, this is the highest percentage of GNP
dedicated to environmental programs for any developing country. 7
President Salinas has taken other steps to expand environmental protection.
He required additional environmental inspectors nationwide: from 700 in 1989
to 1,200 in 1993." Similarly, he increased environmental inspections from
1,380 in 1989 to over 9,000 in the first half of 1993 alone. 9 In addition, the
Mexican government announced a three-year, $466 million border environmen-
tal protection program as an initiative under the Integrated Border Plan with
the United States. 20 Funds have been allocated for sewage treatment, air
pollution monitoring, emergency response, enforcement and training projects. 21
An additional $1.8 billion World Bank loan will assist Mexico in developing
improved methods of wastewater treatment, sanitation and sewerage, and waste
management.' Internationally, Mexico was the first country in the world to
ratify the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol agreements, designed to
protect the earth's ozone layer.23
11. FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 5, at 7.
12. Id. at 7-8.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Dennis J. Krumholz, Under NAFTA, Mexico No Safe Haven for Polluters, 133 N.J.L.J.
1264, 1264 (1993).
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerc Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1991) [hereinafter NAFTA Commerce Hearings] (statement
of Hon. Terry L. Bruce).
16. James Borghesani, Envirotechs Expect to Clean Air with NAFTA, BOSTON Bus. J., Oct.
8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBJ File.
17. Camillo, supra note 10, at 38.
18. Id. at 39.
19. Id.
20. Id. See also notes 133-15 and accompanying text.
21. Camillo, supra note 10, at 38.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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B. Air Quality
Despite the Mexican government's recent efforts, its past failure to devote
sufficient resources to environmental protection has had lasting effects on that
nation's environment. A stark example of the history of Mexican environmen-
tal policy may be found in Mexico City, which is frequently cited as having the
worst air pollution in the world.24 With a population of twenty million people,
Mexico City and the immediate vicinity contain nearly one quarter of Mexico's
entire population.' Emissions from three million vehicles and 35,000
industrial facilities26 have created a massive air quality problem. To make
matters worse, the geography of Mexico City makes it highly susceptible to
thermal inversions,2 7 the atmospheric condition responsible for smog in Los
Angeles, The air pollution problem is so acute that the city exceeded World
Health Organization health guidelines on 310 days in 1990,28 and atmospheric
pollution contributes to hundreds of deaths in Mexico City annually. 9
Automobile emissions generate eighty percent of the air pollution in
Mexico City.3" In response to both internal and external political pressure, the
Mexican government initiated a number of measures designed to reduce auto
emissions. For example, virtually all city-owned vehicles, buses, and taxis have
been modernized to incorporate pollution control devices such as catalytic
converters.3" Although emissions testing was adopted in 1988, this program
has suffered from corruption and a lack of trained personnel.32
In recent years, the Mexican government has stepped up environmental
enforcement. For example, in 1991, the government closed one of the largest
factories in Mexico City for air pollution violations at a cost of roughly $500
million. 3 This factory, an oil refinery that comprises seven percent of
Mexico's refining capacity,34 had been responsible for about four percent of
Mexico City's air pollution.
Air pollution control measures receive popular support. In 1989, for
example, the government began the "Hoy no Circula" (no driving day)
24. Chuck Freadhoff, NAFTA Speeds Mexican Efforts to Tackle Environmental Issues,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, INVDLY File.
25. Mumme, supra note 9, at 8.
26. ld. at 11.
27. IL
28. Id.
29. U.S. GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-91-227, U.S.-MExico TRADE:
INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 3 (1991).
30. Mumme, supra note 9, at 11.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Alexander F. Watson, Address to the
Greater North Michigan Avenue Association and the Executives' Club of Chicago (Sept. 2,1993),
in DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 610, 611 (1993).
35. Mumme, supra note 9, at 26.
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program. 6 This program requires drivers to find alternate transportation one
day per week. Although business interest groups attempted to discontinue the
program in 1990, the government kept it intact because of its strong support
among local residents. 7 In addition to local support for specific programs, a
growing grassroots environmental movement is beginning to influence the
political process.38 Although the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
dominates Mexican politics, small environmental parties have appeared and the
PRI has had to address environmental matters in recent elections. 9
C. Water Quality
As with air, Mexico's past failure to implement adequate environmental
protection has adversely impacted the water quality in Mexico as well as in the
United States.4" Officials in both countries blame most of Mexico's water
pollution problems on insufficient sewer systems and wastewater treatment
facilities.41 Mexico's rapid population growth and industrialization have simply
overwhelmed its limited infrastructure. Only sixteen percent of Mexico's
municipal and industrial wastewater is treated before being released,42 posing
risks to citizens on both sides of the border.
An example of the effect that population and industrialization have on
water quality can be seen in the area along the U.S.-Mexico border. This
region contains the maquiladoras.43 Maquiladoras are industrial facilities built
in Mexico along the U.S. border to take advantage of favorable tariffs.44 As
a result of this arrangement, the border population exploded. In recent years,
the number of maquiladoras has grown at an annual rate of fifteen percent.4 5
The area now contains more than 1,600 industrial processing and assembly
plants with about 400,000 employees.46 City populations in this area have
multiplied rapidly. For example, Ciudad Juarez grew by 135 percent between
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 28-29.
40. Carol M. Browner, Color This Trade Pact 'Green', THE HERALD-SUN (Durham N.C.),
Sept. 29, 1993, at All.
41. U.S. GENERAL ACCOtUMNG OFFICE, supra note 4, at 4.
42. Id.
43. Maquiladora, translated literally, means "bonded assembly plant." COLLINS SPANISH
DIcrIONARY 319 (2d ed. 1993).
44. Products manufactured in this region and exported back into the United States are subject
to significantly lower tariffs than products from elsewhere in Mexico. The predominately U.S.-
owned companies in the region are attracted by Mexico's low wages, minimal labor standards,
and lax environmental laws. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of
Alex Hittle, Friends of the Earth).
45. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 176 (submitted by Mary E. Kelly, Texas
Center for Policy Studies, and Dick Kamp, Border Ecology Project).
46. Ward & Prickett, supra note 6, at 2.
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1975 and 1985 and now has around one million residents.47 Similarly, Tijuana
grew from 200,000 residents in 1960 to between 750,000 and one million
today.48
Unfortunately, infrastructure in the border region, in particular sewers and
wastewater treatment facilities, has not kept pace with the population explosion.
The quantity of human waste released untreated into the area has been
tremendous. The Council of Scientific Affairs of the American Medical
Association estimates that 46 million liters of raw sewage flow each day into the
Tijuana River in Baja, California; 76 million liters into the New River at
Calexico-Mexicali on the California border; and 84 million liters into the Rio
Grande between Texas and Mexico.49 This sewage threatens both surface
water and groundwater sources, many of which are used for drinking water by
both Mexicans and Americans." The contamination of drinking water in the
border town of San Elizario, Texas, illustrates the magnitude of the problem.
Thirty-five percent of the town's children contract Hepatitis A by age eight and
ninety percent of adults contract it by age thirty-five.51
Industrial waste from the maquiladoras also contaminates the water
systems. Researchers from the National Toxics Campaign found serious
contamination in every border site sampled, with contamination levels up to
1,000 times higher than both United States and Mexican standards. 52 They
also discovered seriously contaminated effluent coming from large U.S.-owned
companies 3 For example, at the General Motors plant in Matamoros,
Mexico, the effluent stream pouring directly into an open canal contained
nearly 3 million parts per billion of xylene, an organic solvent-more than 6,000
times U.S. drinking water standards.54 The effluent contained high concentra-
tions of other toxic organic chemicals, including 430 parts per million (ppm) of
ethyl benzene, 56 ppm of acetone, 41 ppm of methylene chloride, and 5.7 ppm
of benzene.55 The U.S. EPA's cumulative permissible limit for all toxic
organic chemicals discharged from a plant similar to General Motor's is 2.13
ppm. The Mexican regulations parallel the U.S. standards5 6
Unfortunately, the amount of money needed to improve Mexico's water
quality is enormous. A study by the University of Texas at El Paso estimates
that $9 billion is necessary to meet the infrastructure needs of the border region
47. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 176 (submitted by Mary E. Kelly, Texas
Center for Policy Studies, and Dick Kamp, Border Ecology Project).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 175.
50. Id.
51. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 138 (statement of Alex Hittle, Friends of
the Earth).
52. Id. at 111 (statement of Craig Merrilees, National Toxics Campaign).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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alone.57 In one major effort, the Mexican National Water Commission plans
to build sewage wastewater treatment facilities in twenty-two major cities
throughout Mexico.58 The facilities will be constructed with the help of World
Bank funding and should be able to treat 50 percent of Mexico's wastewater in
four years. 59
Mexican efforts to control pollution have included hiring new environmen-
tal inspectors for the border region and elsewhere.' As a consequence of this
effort, Mexican inspectors have shut down numerous American-owned
maquiladoras for non-compliance. Other facilities have spent millions of dollars
over the last few years to comply with Mexico's new regulations.6 If, as
expected, Mexico becomes more prosperous under NAFTA, both its desire and
its ability to improve water quality should increase.
D. Hazardous Waste
Just as with nonhazardous waste, Mexico has an insufficient number of
treatment facilities to handle the amount of hazardous waste it generates.
Mexico currently generates about 13,000 tons of hazardous waste daily. 2 Yet,
only three facilities treat hazardous waste and only ten facilities dispose of it.63
To increase capacity, Mexico contracted with Chemical Waste Management, a
U.S. company, to build an incinerator to handle the 2,500 tons of hazardous
waste generated daily in Mexico City.'M Despite such efforts, much of
Mexico's hazardous waste is still simply released into the sewer systems, effluent
flows, or placed in drums to be dumped in deserts or elsewhere.6 5 Mexico's
hazardous waste problem is so large that it will require between $5 and 9 billion
to clean up the border region alone.66
A 1990 SEDUE study of hazardous waste handling by Mexico's maquila-
doras found the following: of the 1,963 facilities, an estimated fifty-two percent,
57. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 138-39 (statement of Alex Hittle, Friends
of the Earth).
58. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 29, at 4.
59. Id.
60. See infra Part IH(C).
61. The North American Free Trade Agreement, 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on
International Economic Policy and Trade and Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1991) [hereinafter NAFTA Foreign Affairs
Hearings] (statement of Jim Kolbe, Congressional Representative from Arizona).
62. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 29, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Mumme, supra note 9, at 26.
65. Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging
United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 275 (1992).
66. North American Free Trade Agreement, 1992: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation,
Business Opportunities, and Energy of the House Comm. on Small Business, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
64 (1992) (testimony of Dick Kamp, Border Ecology Project).
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or 1,020 facilities, generated hazardous waste.67 Of the hazardous waste
generators, only thirty percent complied with Mexican regulations requiring that
information on the amount and nature of the hazardous waste be submitted to
SEDUE." Mexican law requires that foreign-owned companies recycle
hazardous waste or return it to their own country for disposal. The SEDUE
study estimated that only nineteen percent of facilities fully complied with this
law while another fifteen percent returned their waste without complying with
the applicable reporting requirements.69 Although returning hazardous waste
to the foreign country, usually the United States, means that the disposal can
be done properly, importing hazardous waste for disposal faces strong
opposition within the United States.7'
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS IN NAFTA AND THE SIDE AGREEMENT
When negotiating NAFTA, the Administration of President George Bush
treated environmental protection and free trade as separate issues. As a result,
President Bush's trade negotiators refused to incorporate specific environmental
protections into the text of NAFTA.7" Instead, they relied on broad state-
ments of commitment to environmental protection within the agreement and
negotiated separate agreements outside the main NAFTA document to protect
the environment. For instance, the Bush Administration directed the U.S. EPA
to work with Mexico's SEDUE to develop a separate plan to solve the
pollution problems along the U.S.-Mexico border. This border plan includes
an increase in the funds spent by the United States and Mexico on enforcement
of environmental regulations in the border region.72 In 1993, President Bill
Clinton's Administration adopted Bush's conceptual approach, but negotiated
more specific environmental protections through a side agreement to NAFTA.
President Clinton also pledged additional funds to help ease NAFTA's
environmental impacts on the border region.
A. General Environmental Guarantees in NAFTA
When President Bush preliminarily approved NAFTA on December 17,
1992, proponents argued that NAFTA's broad textual statements of support for
environmental protection were adequate to safeguard the environment. For
instance, the Preamble clearly states that new employment opportunities must
67. NAFTA Commerce Hearings, supra note 15, at 177 (submitted by Mary E. Kelly, Texas
Center for Policy Studies, and Dick Kamp, Border Ecology Project).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. For example, the state of Louisiana passed legislation expressly banning the importation
of hazardous waste. A federal court overturned this law because of trade agreements with
Mexico. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La. 1991), aff'd,
967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
71. FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 5, at 8.
72. Feeley & Knier, supra note 65, at 264-65.
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be implemented in "a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation."73 Parties are committed to "strengthen the development and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."'74 The Assessment of
Risk provisions state that "a party may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives,
conduct an assessment of risk. In conducting such assessment, a party may
consider, among other factors relating to a good or service: ... (d) environmen-
tal conditions."'75 Article 906 commits all parties to "work jointly to enhance
the level of safety and of protection of human, animal and plant life and health,
the environment and consumers."'76 Under Article 904, parties have the right
to establish their own levels of protection for the environment, if not in conflict
with Article 907, which prohibits "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"77
or "disguised restriction[s]."'8 These are the explicit environmental protections
incorporated into the text of NAFTA.
The environmental provisions in NAFTA, however, do not create any
binding obligations on the parties. NAFTA uses generally permissive language
when referring to environmental protection. Although a party may consider the
impact on the environment, it is not obligated to do so.7" Where the language
of the commitments takes on a more definitive posture (for instance, parties
shall work jointly to enhance the environment),0 the object of the commit-
ment is amorphous at best. This non-binding language conforms with the Bush
Administration's policy to treat environmental issues separately from trade
issues.
President Clinton made NAFTA a top priority for his new administration,
pushing Congress to adopt the agreement as negotiated by the Bush Adminis-
tration.8 ' Nonetheless, NAFTA critics attacked the Bush proposal as lacking
sufficient clarity to warrant support. When criticizing NAFTA's health and
safety standards, the Sierra Club noted that various terms could be interpreted
to undermine domestic environmental laws.' For instance, under the heading
of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, NAFTA gives each party to the
agreement the right to "adopt, maintain, or apply any sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measure necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health." 3 Opponents argued that if a narrow definition of "necessary" were
73. NAFTA, supra note 1, at pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 297.
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at art. 907(1), 32 I.L.M. at 387-88.
76. Id. at art. 906(1), 32 I.L.M. at 387 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at art. 907(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 388.
78. Id. at art. 907(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 388.
79. Id. at art. 907(1), 32 I.L.M. at 387-388.
80. Id. at art. 906(1), 32 I.L.M. at 387.
81. David S. Cloud, Clinton Enlists Big Guns in Push for NAFTA, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
2436, 2436-37 (1993).
82. David S. Cloud, Sound and Fury over NAFTA Overshadows the Debate, 51 CONG. Q.
WKLY REP. 2793 (1993).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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used, strict environmental and health regulations could be challenged under
NAFTA as more protective than necessary.' Environmentalists' primary
concern about the agreement was that NAFTA would open avenues to
challenge stringent health or safety laws on the ground that these laws create
unfair trade barriers. Critics warned that state and local laws would be at a
particularly high risk of being overturned. 5
B. Attempts to Strengthen the Environmental Safeguards Under NAFTA
Through a Side Agreement
President Clinton demonstrated a willingness to entertain modifications to
the agreement. As a result, when seeking Congressional approval of NAFTA
under the fast-track process, 6 the Clinton Administration offered Congress
NAFTA as negotiated by the Bush Administration, but included three
additional side agreements that cover labor and environmental issues.8 7
Although some critics suggest that the side agreements were nothing more
than an effort to mute environmental and labor dissenters,' evidence indicates
that the Clinton Administration was also concerned with the overall impact of
lax environmental protection under NAFTA on the U.S. economy. Vice-
President Gore stressed the importance of linking trade and the environment
in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance:
It will also be increasingly important to incorporate standards of environmental
responsibility in the laws and treaties dealing with international trade. Just as
government subsidies of a particular industry are sometimes considered unfair
under the trade laws, weak and ineffectual enforcement of pollution control
measures should also be included in the definition of unfair trading practices.
Especially as the United States attempts to expand free market principles and
encourage freer and fairer trade throughout Latin America, environmental
standards must be included among the criteria for deciding when to liberalize
trading arrangements with each country.89
President Clinton brought this mindset to the negotiations with Canada and
Mexico over the side agreements.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2795.
86. Under the fast-track process, the President submits the treaty to Congress for a Yes-No
vote. Congress cannot alter the treaty; it must either accept or reject it as negotiated.
87. Congress approved NAFTA contingent on the United States' participation in the three
side agreements. Implementation Act §101(B)(2), 107 Stat. at 2062. Of the three side
agreements, two involve environmental issues. The term "Side Agreements," as used in this
Note, refers to the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada, the Government
of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, Sept. 14,
1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in LEXIS, Legis Library, DREXEC File [hereinafter Side
Agreement].
88. David S. Cloud, The History of the Deal, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3180, 3180 (1993).
89. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 343 (1992).
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Unlike NAFTA's broad declarations of support for environmental
protection, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation9"
(Side Agreement) takes a more practical approach to addressing environmental
issues. Although the Preamble affirms the parties' support for general
environmental principles such as "sustainable development," exploitable
domestic resources, and "enhanced levels of environmental protection,"91 the
Side Agreement is structured to identify the environmental objectives of the
parties. Its goals are to increase the information base for environmental issues
so that more informed decisions can be made; to clarify how a party's domestic
environmental laws are affected; and to provide mechanisms for resolving
environmental disputes.
Article One delineates the objectives of the Side Agreement. The parties
promise to
foster the protection and improvement of the environment ... ; promote
sustainable development ... ; increase cooperation between the Parties to
better conserve, protect, and enhance the environment, including wild flora and
fauna; ... enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws
and regulations ... ; promote transparency and public participation in the
development of environmental laws, regulations and policies; promote
economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and promote
pollution prevention policies and practices?2
Although these objectives appear to be of the same general character as those
used in NAFTA, close analysis reveals that they are more specific and that they
identify environmental principles not included in NAFTA.
The Obligations section of the Side Agreement requires that the parties
take specific steps to increase the level of information available on environmen-
tal issues.93 Article Two requires each party to prepare and publish periodic
reports on the state of the environment within their respective territories."
Parties are also obligated to promote environmental education,9" assess
environmental impacts,96 and promote efficient achievement of environmental
goals through the use of economic instruments.97 The parties agree, at a
minimum, to consider recommendations developed by the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), created under Article Eight of the Side
Agreement.9"
90. See Side Agreement, supra note 87.
91. Id at pmbl.
92. Id. at art. 1(a)-(c), (g)-(j).
93. Id. at arts. 2-7.
94. Id. at art. 2(1)(a).
95. Id. at art. 2(1)(c).
96. Id. at art. 2(1)(e).
97. Id. at art. 2(1)(f). This provision allows flexibility in implementing alternative mechanisms
to achieve environmental objectives.
98. Id. at art. 2(2). See infra notes 108-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
[4:62
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Article Five of the Side Agreement commits each government to enforcing
its domestic environmental laws.99 Each government, when enforcing its
environmental laws and regulations, shall aim to achieve "high levels of
environmental protection and compliance."'' 0  Admittedly, "high levels" is
somewhat ambiguous, but there does appear to be a commitment to improving
environmental enforcement by requiring parties to hire inspectors,1 1 monitor
compliance and investigate violations,"~ publicly release noncompliance
information,0 3 and keep records and reports.0 4 In addition, parties must
provide judicial remedies' 5 and appropriate sanctions.0 6 The Side Agree-
ment also requires the parties to ensure that private individuals or groups have
access to remedies.0 7 These provisions demonstrate a marked increase in
specificity for environmental protection over the more general language of
NAFTA.
C. Enforcement Mechanisms under the Side Agreement
The Side Agreement's specific environmental protections are meaningless
without enforcement mechanisms. The CEC may provide the needed
institutional mechanism for enforcement. The CEC's tripartite structure' °8
consists of a Council of cabinet-level officials,0 9 the Secretariat (composed of
newly appointed officials from each country),"0 and Advisory Commit-
tees.''
The Secretariat has primary responsibility for monitoring compliance with
the Side Agreement. It must, for example, issue an annual report detailing the
actions taken by each party in connection with its environmental obligations
under the Side Agreement, including enforcement efforts." Periodically, the
CEC and its scope of authority.
99. Id. at art. 5(1).
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 5(l)(a).
102. Id. at art. 5(l)(b).
103. Id. at art. 5(1)(d).
104. Id. at art. 5(1)(g).
105. Id. at art. 5(2).
106. Id. at art. 5(3).
107. Id. at art. 6; see also id. at art. 14(1). These are particularly important provisions for
environmental interest groups. These groups can independently monitor compliance with the
agreement and request that a government take action. If such a group has a legally recognized
interest, Article 6(2) grants that group "appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of the Party's environmental laws and regulations." Id.
at art. 6(2). In other words, Articles 6 and 14 specifically protect the power of public interest
groups to act as watchdogs.
108. Id. at art. 8.
109. Id. at art. 9(1).
110. Id. at art. 11.
111. Id. at art. 16-18.
112. Id. at art. 12(2)(c).
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report must address the "state of the environment" in each country."3 The
Secretariat is also empowered to consider properly submitted complaints that
a party is failing to "effectively enforce its environmental law"" 4 and to
request a response from the breaching party."5 This process pressures parties
to comply with their own environmental standards.
D. Financing Environmental Improvements along the U.S.-Mexico Border
In negotiations in the Fall of 1993, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor and Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime
Serra recognized that environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border
are issues of mutual concern. The two officials identified a significant need to
coordinate and fund infrastructure projects along the border."6 On the basis
of this'need, the Clinton Administration, prior to the NAFTA vote in Congress,
agreed to fund infrastructure improvements along the border to stem
environmental degradation."7 The Administration established what will be
the North American Development Bank, a $450 million fund to issue $3 billion
in federally guaranteed bonds. The money is to be used to fund community
economic development and environmental cleanup along the border."'
The Administration's willingness to fund such projects indicates two things.
First, the Administration recognizes that NAFTA will have some adverse
environmental impacts on the U.S.-Mexico border unless growth is accompanied
by infrastructure improvements. Second, the Clinton Administration seems
willing to take steps designed to minimize these impacts.
III. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF NAFTA ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The success or failure of NAFTA in protecting the environment will
depend largely on the thoroughness with which the three parties address the
complex issues covered by NAFTA and their commitment to solving the
inevitable problems and disputes. This part analyzes the potential economic
and environmental consequences of free trade under NAFrA.
A. Links Between Free Trade and Environmental Protection
NAFTA integrates the economies of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico by providing greater access to markets. This access should result in a
more sophisticated Mexican economy. As investment in Mexico increases, its
113. Id. at art. 12(3).
114. Id. at art. 14(1).
115. Id. at art. 14(2).
116. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET, FUNDING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN THE U.S. MExICo BORDER REGION 1 (1993).
117. Keith Bradsher, The Free Trade Accord: Dealing; Clinton's Shopping List for Votes Has
Ring of Grocery Buyer's List, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A21.
118. Congress authorized the United States' participation in the North American Develop-
ment Bank. Implementation Act §541, 107 Stat. at 2165.
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infrastructure, income, and education levels should also improve. The Bush
Administration estimated, based on three economic studies, that all three
countries will enjoy increased trade and incomes due to NAFTA."9
The biggest economic gains will likely accrue in Mexico because the
Mexican economy has the most ground to gain relative to the economies of
Canada and the United States. For instance, Mexican productivity levels are
about twenty percent of those in the United States, and income levels are only
ten percent of U.S. workers'. This gap in productivity and income levels
should close as North American corporations combine capital with Mexican
labor and organize that labor more efficiently."
A 1991 study by Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger analyzed income
data and its relationship to air pollution. 2  This cross-country sample of
comparable measures of pollution" found that increases in air pollution24
correlate with a rise in the Gross Domestic Product' (GDP) for countries
with low levels of individual income. The air pollution levels, however, tend to
decrease as GDP increases in countries with higher per capita incomes.
According to this study, the income threshold lies somewhere between $4,000
and $5,000 per capita, measured in 1985 U.S. dollars. Once per capita income
surpasses the threshold level, per capita air pollution levels should begin to
decrease. 26 Grossman and Krueger theorized that Mexico's rise in per capita
income to $4,996 in 1988127 explained its recent attempts to address environ-
mental problems, including reducing the lead content of gasoline, requiring
catalytic converters in automobiles, using natural gas rather than fuel oil in
power plants, and shutting down major sources of pollution in Mexico City."
Grossman and Krueger speculate that under a trade liberalization plan such
as NAFTA, several factors would help reduce pollution levels. First, public
concern for the environment should increase as individual incomes rise and
standards of living improve. Second, as restrictions on foreign investment are
119. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXIco ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ISSUES 61 (1992).
120. RONALD J. WONNACOTT, THE ECONOMICS OF OVERLAPPING FREE TRADE AREAS AND
THE MEXICAN CHALLENGE 49 (Canadian-American Committee 1991).
121. Id. at 50.
122. GROSSMAN & KRUEGER, supra note 3, at 5.
123. The air pollution data were collected starting in 1976 through a joint project of the World
Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, which operates the Global
Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). The goal of the project was to monitor concentra-
tions of several air pollutants. Id. at 7.
124. Defined in terms of sulfur dioxide and dark matter suspended in the air. Id. at 8.
125. A country's gross domestic product is the total market value of goods and services
produced within a country during a given period, excluding income derived from investments
abroad. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 742 (1987).
126. GROSSMAN & KRUEGER, supra note 3, at 7-20.
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id.
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relaxed, foreign producers from within the trade area will transfer cleaner, more
modem technologies to the local economy. Third, increased income levels that
tend to coincide with augmented trade will give people greater ability to
"demand a cleaner environment as an expression of their national wealth."'29
Mexicans will pressure their government to ensure that environmental
protections are more prominent in the legislative agenda. Finally, increased
economic activity and income levels will generate larger tax revenues, providing
the Mexican government with additional resources for environmental
enforcement and other domestic agendas. Given the strong evidence that
incomes in Mexico will rise under a free trade agreement and that higher
incomes lead to corresponding reductions in air pollution levels, NAFTA would
seem to be a positive factor for the Mexican environment.
Economic growth, however, can have negative impacts on the environment
too. Although the transfer of modem technologies may result in the use of
cleaner technologies, economic growth could offset the environmental gains by
increasing the overall demand for pollution-generating products. For instance,
with respect to automobiles, NAFTA is expected to increase the total number
of cars in Mexico as Mexicans become wealthier and as their infrastructure
accommodates greater mobility. Additionally, eliminating trade barriers such
as tariffs and quotas will make American automobiles less expensive for
Mexicans. 3 '
Other aspects of Mexico's pollution problems will also be affected by
NAFTA. The increased economic activity will increase the amount of industrial
activity in Mexico. Although new industrial plants will be cleaner than old
plants as foreign technology is imported into Mexico, it is not clear whether the
decrease in pollution due to the greater availability and cost-effectiveness of
pollution control technology will offset the increased emissions of new plants.
One area in which new technology may provide solutions is in hazardous waste
treatment and disposal. Trade liberalization should make waste treatment
technologies more available and affordable in Mexico."' Without stronger
regulations and enforcement, new technology alone cannot solve Mexico's
hazardous waste disposal problem.
B. Environmental Dispute Resolution under NAFTA
This section describes the mechanisms and institutions under NAFTA and
the Side Agreement that can be used to protect the environment in Mexico and
in the border region. If institutions approach implementation with a purely
trade-based philosophy, such as that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the environment will likely suffer. If, however, the institutions
129. Id. at 4-5.
130. NAFTA Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 61, at 6 (statement of Jim Kolbe,
Congressional Representative from Arizona).
131. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 119, at 70.
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also address the environmental ramifications of trade, NAFTA will provide a
means through which environmental protection is more easily and effectively
achieved. As discussed below in Section III(B)(3), the International Boundary
and Water Commission (IBWC) exemplifies this latter, more integrated
approach to environmental dispute resolution.
1. Institutional Framework for Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA and the
Side Agreement
NAFTA contains dispute resolution provisions that can be used to protect
the environment. The Free Trade Commission (FTC) created in Article 2001
establishes the basis for dispute settlement. The FTC has responsibility for
implementing and interpreting NAFTA and the authority to settle disputes.
The FTC is empowered to create a Secretariat which will establish permanent
offices to provide technical and administrative assistance.12  If the FTC
cannot resolve a dispute through mediation, it may establish a panel and submit
the matter to arbitration."' As environmental/trade disputes erupt under
NAFTA, these dispute resolution mechanisms become critical to resolving
conflicts.
The Side Agreement provides additional environmental dispute resolution
mechanisms. Within the CEC,"' the Council establishes a forum for discuss-
ing "environmental matters within the scope of [NAFTA];"'35 for reviewing
"questions and differences" of interpretation or application; 36 and for
promoting cooperation among the parties.'37 The Side Agreement authorizes
the CEC Council to consider the following: data on environmental matters' 38
recommendations regarding -pollution prevention techniques, 39 scientific
research and technology development, 4 conservation and protection of wild
flora and fauna and their habitat,' environmental emergency preparedness
and response activities, 42 environmental implications of goods throughout
their life cycles,'14 3 exchange of environmental scientists,'" and eco-
132. NAFTA at art. 2002; 32 I.L.M. at 693-94. Unlike the Secretariat created under the Side
Agreement, see supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text, the role of the Secretariat under the
FTC is only generally described. See id. at art. 2002(3); 32 I.L.M. at 693-94.
133. Id. at art. 2008; 32 I.L.M. at 695.
134. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
135. Side Agreement, supra note 88, at art. 10(1)(a).
136. Id. at art. 10(1)(d).
137. Id. at art. 10(1)(f).
138. Id. at art. 10(2)(a).
139. Id. at art. 10(2)(b).
140.Id. at art. 10(2)(e).
141. Id. at art. 10(2)(i).
142. Id. at art. 10(2)(k).
143. Id. at art. 10(2)(m).
144. Id. at art. 10(2)(o).
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labeling.'45 The Council's responsibilities also include strengthening environ-
mental laws and regulations by promoting the exchange of information and
developing compatible environmental technical standards, as long as those
standards do not reduce levels of environmental protection. 46 The Council
is directed to facilitate dispute resolution by working with the FTC and by
identifying experts who can provide information or technical advice to NAFTA
committees or working groups. 47 Finally, the Council's powers include
assessing the environmental impacts of proposed projects with transboundary
effects and recommending steps to mitigate those impacts. 41
The Side Agreement also establishes a procedure under which any of the
three parties can criticize another's failure to enforce domestic environmental
laws.'49 The complaining party initially must request a consultation with the
"offending party" to determine whether a pattern of persistent failure to
enforce environmental laws or regulations is evidenced. 5 ' If a mutually
satisfactory resolution is not reached within sixty days, the aggrieved party may
initiate procedures before the CEC Council.' If the Council does not
resolve the matter, it shall, on written request, convene a panel to arbitrate the
dispute. 2 Other member countries with substantial interests may join the
action at this point.153 Based on the information presented and any additional
expert advice, the panel will determine whether "there has been a persistent
pattern of failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its
environmental law."' 54 If the panel makes an affirmative determination, then
the non-complying party is obligated to adopt and implement a remedial action
plan.' The Side Agreement provides additional mechanisms for enforcing
the remedy, 56 but ultimately enforcement is left in the hands of the party
violating its own environmental standards.17  As with most treaties, the
benefits of remaining a member of NAFTA compel the parties to abide by its
provisions and the decisions of its institutional bodies.
145. Id. at art. 10(2)(r).
146. Id. at art. 10(3).
147. Id. at art. 10(6)(c).
148. Id. at art. 10(7).
149. Id. at art. 22(1).
150. Id.
151. Id. at art. 23(1).
152. Id. at art. 24.
153. Id. at art. 24(2); see also id. at art. 29. If NAFrA expands to include more countries,
the right of other interested members to participate in dispute resolution proceedings will become
increasingly important.
154. Id. at art. 31(2)(b).
155. Id. at art. 33.
156. Id. at art. 33-36.
157. Id. at art. 37.
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2. A Trade-Based Approach to Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
Conflict Between Mexican Tuna Fishing and U.S. Efforts to Protect Dolphins
Environmental dispute settlement under GATT provides lessons for
implementing NAFTA. The dispute between Mexico and the United States
over tuna imports exemplifies a successful arbitration under GATT that could
be used as a model for dispute resolution under NAFTA. The outcome of the
case, however, illustrates the dangers that a trade agreement can pose for
efforts to protect the environment. International trade agreements can
undermine domestic environmental laws if these laws are viewed as a restraint
on free trade.
Many tuna fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean set their purse-
seine nets around dolphins, because the dolphins tend to swim with yellowfin
tuna. The fishermen thus trap dolphins along with tuna in their nets. As the
nets are drawn tighter, the dolphins suffocate or are mutilated. The fishermen
then discard the dolphins. This fishing practice has killed over six million
dolphins in the past thirty years. 5'
Environmentalists in the United States pressured Congress to reduce the
number of dolphins killed as a consequence of tuna fishing. Congress passed
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA),'59 which establishes a
national protection policy for marine mammals. The MMPA requires foreign
countries importing into the United States tuna harvested using purse-seines to
(1) develop a similar regulatory scheme to that used in the United States; (2)
limit the number of dolphins killed to no more than 1.25 times the U.S rate;
and (3) comply with U.S. dolphin mortality limits for two species of dol-
phins. 60
Congress also passed the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
of 1990 (DPCIA), 6' establishing labeling standards for the retail sale of tuna
and tuna products. The DPCIA delineates standards that must be met before
a can of tuna or tuna products may bear the label "dolphin safe" or any similar
designation. The Act specifically identifies purse-seine nets in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific as failing to meet the labeling standards.' 6
In 1990, pursuant to the DPCIA and MMPA, the United States imposed
an embargo on imports of commercial yellowfin tuna harvested with purse-seine
nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. This embargo included yellowfin tuna
caught by the Mexican fishing fleet. Mexico requested consultations with the
United States regarding the embargo. In early 1991, Mexico brought an action
158. Don Mayer & David Hoch, International Environmental Protection and the GATT: The
Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L. J. 187, 198 (1993).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1421 (1988).
160. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 116, at 21 (1992).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1993).
162. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, #DS21/R, UNITED STATES-
RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TUNA: REPORT OF THE PANEL 7 (1991).
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under GATT to establish a dispute panel to settle its conflict with the United
States. Specifically, Mexico complained that the "embargo provisions in
MMPA... were inconsistent with [GATT's] general prohibition of quantitative
restrictions" and that the "implementing regulations established discriminatory
specific conditions for a specific geographic area.' ' 63 Mexico also argued that
the DPCIA conflicted with GAT, because it established a discriminatory
condition for a particular geographic area."6 The United States denied
Mexico's allegations and asserted arguendo that any inconsistencies with other
GATT provisions fell within exemptions outlined in the agreement.1 65 The
Dispute Panel ruled in favor of Mexico with regard to the MMPA and held that
"a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its own.' 66
The panel, however, did not find that the labeling provisions of the DPCIA
violated the provisions of GATTF. 167
The Dispute Panel decision provides insight for evaluating NAFTA. First,
it demonstrates that disputes arising under a trade agreement can be adjudica-
ted in a relatively short period of time. This decision took less than nine
months from the time Mexico requested a panel review."6 This suggests that
NAFTA, which contains similar dispute resolution procedures, will enable
parties to resolve disputes efficiently. Second, the decision regarding the
DPCIA indicates that labeling standards, such as preconditions for labels
identifying "green" products, do not conflict with free trade principles.
The Dispute Panel's decision, however, raises troubling questions about the
relationship between international trade accords and efforts to protect the
environment. In passing the MMPA, Congress sought to protect dolphins
against needless slaughter by prohibiting the importation of tuna not caught in
accordance with the MMPA guidelines. 69 Although the action by the
Dispute Panel did not overturn the effect of the MMPA with respect to the
U.S. fishing fleet, the precedent essentially prevents the U.S. law from having
any legally binding effect on foreign environmental conduct, thereby undermin-
ing the purpose of the law. Foreign fishing fleets may catch tuna in direct
violation of MMPA provisions, and the United States is unable to prevent
importation of this tuna due to GATT provisions against trade discrimination.
In other words, the international trade accord allows other countries to
163. Id.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 50. Although Mexico won the decision by the Dispute Panel, it ultimately
modified its fishing practices to encourage the passage of NAFTA and to preserve good relations
with the United States. See FLETCHER & TIEMANN, supra note 5, at 4.
167. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE, supra note 162, at 51.
168. Note that the process would have taken longer if the United States had appealed the
decision.
169. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1372-1373.
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circumvent U.S. domestic environmental law, because the environmental
protection is seen as a restraint on free trade.
Enforcing U.S. environmental regulations against only domestic fishermen
puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Mexican fisherman who do not have
to bear these compliance costs will be able to undercut U.S. prices. The
competitive pressures on domestic industries may undermine efforts to protect
the environment. By preventing a party to the trade agreement from enforcing
its domestic environmental regulations against other parties, the trade
agreement discourages parties from passing strong environmental regulations.
3. An Integrated Approach to Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
International Boundary and Water Commission
The IBWC provides insights into the possible ways in which the FTC and
the CEC might address environmental concerns in Mexico and the United
States. The IBWC is an international agency with recognized expertise and
autonomy in affairs along the border between the United States and Mexico.
The agency is charged with investigating and settling all disputes related to the
"interpretation and application" of the 1944 Water Treaty,170 the 1963
Chazimal Treaty,7'7 and the 1970 Boundary Treaty. Since its establish-
ment in 1889, the IBWC has been the architect of six major treaties that fix and
regulate the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition to this diplomatic role, the IBWC
operates three major dams, two hydroelectric power plants, flood control
projects, and several sewage treatment facilities. These successful operations
illustrate that the IBWC is an effective vehicle for addressing a narrow
spectrum of environmental concerns in the border region.'
The sewage crisis dispute between Tijuana and San Diego provides a good
example of how the IBWC has helped resolve environmental disputes along the
U.S.-Mexico border. Due to tremendous increases in the population in and
around Tijuana, the Mexican city found itself unable to treat the vast amount
of sewage generated by the burgeoning population. During wet weather or
failure of the sewage treatment plant, sewage from Tijuana would flow into the
Pacific Ocean and wash up on the San Diego beaches. Interim solutions were
not successful, and tension on both sides of the border mounted. 74
170. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
171. Convention for the Solution of the Problem of the Chazimal, Aug. 29, 1963, U.S.-Mex.,
15 U.S.T. 21.
172. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and
Colorado River as the International Boundary, Nov. 23, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 23 U.S.T. 371.
173. Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource
Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 661-62 (1990); Farah Khakee, The North
American Free Trade Agreement: The Need to Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 854-57 (1993).
174. John Altomare, Stemming the Flow: The Tijuana-San Diego Sewage Treatment Crisis,
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In 1990, with the help of the IBWC, San Diego and Tijuana signed a joint
agreement to develop a wastewater treatment plant to be constructed, operated,
and maintained by the IBWC.75 The IBWC used its influence and expertise
to bring the parties together over a difficult issue.176 The fact that the new
plant falls under the authority of the IBWC will add to the commission's long-
term stature and authority.
The experience of the IBWC provides several valuable lessons for the CEC
and the FTC. First, for NAFTA to be effective at resolving environmental
disputes, the FTC and the CEC will need to develop the type of autonomy that
the IBWC developed. This will take time. Second, the CEC needs to use the
projects being financed by the North American Trade Bank as a mechanism for
developing prestige and support, much like the IBWC did. Third, the CEC
must recruit experts who can advise the parties and in whom the parties will
develop a sense of trust for unbiased advice. Fourth, the FTC and the CEC
must assert an ability to interpret NAFTA and the Side Agreement. This
authority will enable them to build the necessary power base for enforcing
environmental standards.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
NAFTA will improve environmental conditions indirectly as a result of
increases in income levels. 78 Under the Grossman and Krueger theory, as
the incomes of Mexicans escalate, citizen concern over environmental quality
will also increase, and they will demand stronger environmental protection.
Mexico's expanding economy will also generate additional revenue that can
finance environmental protection and reclamation. Environmental protection,
however, depends on more than economic expansion, as evidenced by the
continued environmental problems in the United States and Canada despite
their highly developed economies.
Trade agreements have created tension between efforts to improve free
trade and to improve the environment. The U.S.-Mexico tuna dispute
21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 361, 376-81 (1991).
175. Id. at 376-90 (detailing events leading to sewage agreement).
176. Id. at 388-90. But see id. at 390-92 (criticizing bureaucratic handling of situation by
IBWC).
177. NAFTA poses unique enforcement problems because the FTC and the CEC will be
attempting to force parties to comply with their own environmental regulations. This differs from
the IBWC's ability to interpret an international agreement. This could create tension between
the parties and the NAFTA institutions.
178. Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), trade in goods and services has
increased about 35 percent from 1987 levels. America's investment in Canada is up 24.6 percent,
and Canadian investment in the United States has increased 50 percent. Although this does not
reflect a direct increase in personal income as analyzed by Grossman and Krueger, the economic
activity under CFTA does suggest a pattern that would lead to increased income levels. See
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1991
ANNUAL REPORT 61-62 (1992).
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illustrates how a trade agreement can be used to undermine environmental
protections by favoring unrestricted trade over the environmental consequences
of that trade. If, in implementing NAFTA and the Side Agreement, the FTC
and CEC only consider trade issues, then environmental standards in Mexico
may never be enforced, because new environmental initiatives could be
interpreted as inhibiting free trade.
The Side Agreement protects domestic environmental regulations from
adverse trade rulings and has the same binding effect on the parties as NAFTA.
The Side Agreement, however, has not removed the tension between trade and
the environment. This tension is evident in Article One of the Side Agreement,
which requires parties to "increase cooperation.., to better conserve, protect,
and enhance the environment, 179 and to "avoid creating trade distortions or
new trade barriers." 8' The agreement does not specify how these distinct
interests are to be harmonized.
Three major concerns remain about the effect of NAFTA on the
environment. First, neither NAFTA nor the Side Agreement incorporates
language to protect against an outcome like that reached by the GATT Dispute
Panel in the tuna case. Therefore, measures designed to protect domestic
industries, subject to environmental regulations, from unregulated foreign
competition will probably fail. Second, NAFTA does not create environmental
parity between parties to the agreement. More stringent environmental
protection laws and enforcement mechanisms in the United States create
incentives for companies to produce goods in Mexico, where laws are less
cumbersome and not strictly enforced. Third, the Clinton Administration is
already discussing the expansion of NAFTA to include Central and South
America."' The Administration, however, has not enunciated an environ-
mental policy for expansion nor has it established the framework for adding
parties to NAFTA and the Side Agreement.
Empowering the FTC and the CEC to develop strict environmental
protocols for protecting the environment represents a crucial step in making
NAFTA an environmentally friendly agreement. In their current configura-
tion, the FTC and the CEC resemble the original form of the IBWC. Unlike
the IBWC, however, the FTC and the CEC currently lack the ability to develop
projects of the type initiated by the IBWC. Because problems similar to the
San Diego-Tijuana sewage crisis will inevitably arise, the FTC and the CEC
must have a stronger basis of authority. The Natural Resources Defense
Council recognized this when it proposed the formation of a North American
Commission on Trade and the Environment to "ensure that trade and economic
integration arising from this agreement throughout the region protects natural
179. Side Agreement, supra note 87, at art. 1(c).
180. Id. at art. 1(e).
181. Administration officials are drafting plans to create a Western Hemisphere free trade
zone within the next ten to fifteen years and have proposed adding Chile to NAFTA late next
year. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Plans Expanded Trade Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,1994, at D1.
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resources and improves environmental quality as well as the health and safety
of citizens in all three countries.""s Ostensibly, the FTC and the CEC could
pursue this course of action, but they will need to have independent power to
interpret the agreement, raise revenues to finance projects, and monitor or
enforce compliance with environmental standards.
The parties to NAFTA need to recognize that inadequate environmental
protection subsidizes businesses operating under one country's lower environ-
mental standards and penalizes businesses attempting to comply with another
country's higher standards. Uniform environmental protection is needed to
create the level playing field that free trade agreements propose. Only through
stringent, uniform standards can the environment be protected and the artificial
subsidy to polluting countries be eliminated. If the FTC and the CEC are given
the authority to adjudicate disputes and enforce higher environmental
standards, NAFTA could help break down the tension between free trade and
environmental protection. This is the best way to protect the environment of
all three countries.
182. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ENVr'L SAFEGUARDS FOR THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (June 1992).
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